Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017

Facts: This case is about the construction of the Torre de Manila in Taft Avenue. The petitioner in this case averred that Torre de Manila will rise behind Rizal Park, clearly dwarfing the statue of our hero and ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point. The court however decided that there actually is no law prohibiting such construction and that Torre de Manila is neither contrary to law, endanger the public health of safety nor its construction contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. It was also not considered by the court as nuisance as defined in the Civil Code. 

Issue: WON constru of DMCI Homes is a nuisance.

Held: No. It was explained in the case that there are two kinds of nuisance. The first one would be nuisance per se, is when an act is a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. While the second one is nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per accidens is determined based on its surrounding conditions and circumstances. These conditions and circumstances must be well established, not merely alleged. It is a question of fact where it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a proper tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance. 

In this case, the SC is not a trier of facts but the RTC. Hence, petition was dismissed.

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA (G.R. No. 103125)

Province of Camarines Sur vs CA (G.R. No. 103125)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the said Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The Trial court denied their motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession the property of the San Joaquins. 

San Joaquins filed a petition to the Court of Appeals to set aside the order of the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals asked the Solicitor General to give his comment to the petition. The Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project. The Court of Appeals then ruled to suspend the expropriation proceedings until the required approval is secured from DAR. 

Issue: WO.N LGUs need to secure approval from DAR before they can convert lands from agricultural use to non-agricultural use?

Held: No, the Supreme Court did not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals where an approval from DAR is a requirement in converting expropriated lands from agricultural used to non-agricultural use or public use. The Court explained that to sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 or the Local Government Code which is the source of authority of the petitioner in passing Resolution No. 129 series of 1988 does not require prior approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Their power to expropriate comes from delegation by the congress and that the court views the power of expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program. The closest provision of law that could be used to justify the requirement of the approval from DAR would be sec. 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which states:

 "SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. - After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation."

However, sec. 65 only applies to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award.” which is not the case of herein subject property.

Furthermore, the issuance of Resolution No. 129 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by the Provincial Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur as it was properly delegated by the Legislative Department through section 9 of the Local Government Code which provides:

"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.”

The intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters in Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is not applicable. 

Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011

 

• Doctrine: RA 9522 did not decrease the demarcation of Ph territory and is merely a statutory tool to establish the country’s maritime zone and continental shelves to comply with UNCLOS.

  
  

• Facts: In March 2009, Republic Act 9522 (Baseline Law), an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984. Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.

  RA 9522 used the baseline method marking specific basepoints along the coasts from where the baselines are drawn. Instead of the Treaty of Paris where a rectangular area delineated Ph embracing hundreds of nautical miles around Ph. Acc to petitioner, baseline law dismembers a large portion of nat’l territory including the Kalayaan Group of Islands and the Scarborough Shoal.

  
  

  The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law have nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. 

  
  

  The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. 

• "Lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated thereto." (https://attymorena.weebly.com/)

  
  

  
  

Tongko v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company G.R. No. 167622 (June 29, 2010)

 Tongko v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, De Dios

G.R. No. 167622 | June 29, 2010 | Brion, J. 

The Principles

• Four-Fold Test
• Labor Code concept of control
• concept of control in insurance industry

Tongko and Manulife’s relationship existed under a Career Agent’s Agreement which provided that Tongko is an independent contractor and that he can be terminated by mere notice. He was promoted to higher positions over the course of his career in Manulife and was made to follow the company Rules and Regulations or Codes. Later, Renato (who seems to be part of the Management) wrote him a letter calling out his poor performance and giving him some guidelines he could follow to improve it. However, shortly after that, Renato followed it up with another letter saying that he is terminating the services of Tongko. 

The latter filed an illegal dismissal complaint arguing that he was an employee of Manulife and that the company is liable for his backwages and separation pay. The Court found Tongko’s argument inconsistent with the Agreement signed by both parties which was never substantially altered over the course of his career and Tongko’s consistent declaration in his ITR that he is a self-employed individual. Following the provisions of Insurance Code, Civil Code and Labor Code, Manulife did not exercise control on Tongko’s actions as an independent agent that would be construed as having an employer-employee relationship. At the very least, the instructions given to him from time to time were part of the principal-agent relationship they had. 

Q: What is the Four-Fold Test?

In Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld, the Court set out the elements of an employer-employee relationship, thus: 

Jurisprudence is firmly settled that whenever the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four elements constitute the reliable yardstick: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which constitutes the most important index of the existence of the employer-employee relationship that is, whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. Stated otherwise, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. 

Q: What is the Labor Code’s concept of “control” that must necessarily exist in a principal-agent relationship?

In this case, Manulife did not exercise the type of control that the Labor Code contemplates. The Codes and Guidelines implemented by Manulife seemed like control amounting to an employer-employee relationship but since it does not intrude into the insurance agents' means and manner of conducting their sales and only control them as to the desired results, it does not amount to the “control” the Labor Code contemplates.

A commitment to abide by the rules and regulations of an insurance company does not ipso facto make the insurance agent an employee. Neither do guidelines somehow restrictive of the insurance agent’s conduct necessarily indicate "control" as this term is defined in jurisprudence.

Guidelines indicative of labor law "control," as the first Insular Life case tells us, should not merely relate to the mutually desirable result intended by the contractual relationship; they must have the nature of dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining the result, or of fixing the methodology and of binding or restricting the party hired to the use of these means.

Q: Can control be exercised without establishing an employer-employee relationship?

Yes, although Manulife exercised a type of control over Tongko, it did not amount to the control contemplated by the Labor Code. Tongko remained an agent all along in absence of a subsequent contract; although his subsequent duties made him a lead agent with leadership role, he was nevertheless only an agent whose basic contract yields no evidence of means-and-manner control. 

Since the factual antecedents were set in an insurance industry, Insurance Code primarily governs. There are built-in elements of control specific to an insurance agency, which do not amount to the elements of control that characterize an employment relationship governed by the Labor Code. The Insurance Code provides definite parameters in the way an agent negotiates for the sale of the company's insurance products.

Under the Insurance Code, "No person, partnership, or association of persons shall transact any insurance business in the Philippines except as agent of a person or corporation authorized to do the business of insurance in the Philippines." The agent must, as a matter of qualification, be licensed and must also act within the parameters of the authority granted under the license and under the contract with the principal.

In addition, under the general law on agency as applied to insurance, an agency must be express in light of the need for a license and for the designation by the insurance company. In this case, the Career Agent’s Agreement fully serves as a grant of authority to Tongko as Manulife’s insurance agent.